LEONARD J. McDonald (SBN 014228) KEVIN P. NELSON (SBN 023381) 2 TIFFAN Y&BOSCO THIRD FLOOR CAMELBACK ESPLANADE II 3 2525 EAST CAMELBACK ROAD PHOENIX, ARIZONA 85016-4237 4 TELEPHONE: (602) 255-6000 FACSIMILE: (602) 255-0103 5 E-Mail: Ijm@tblaw.com kpn@tblaw.com 6 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT WELLS FARGO BANK 7 AND LEHMAN BROTHERS BANK, FSB UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 8 9 DISTRICT OF ARIZONA ANDREW C. BAILEY, (Chapter 11) 10 11 Plaintiff, Case No. 2:09-bk-06979-RTBP 12 Adv. No. 2:09-ap-01731-RTBP VS. 13 WELLS FARGO BANK NA a/k/a REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE 14 (WELLS FARGO); LEHMAN MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 15 BROTHERS BANK FSB (LEHMAN TO DEFENDANTS' WELLS FARGO **BROTHERS**); FIRST AMERICAN BANK, N.A. AND LEHMAN 16 TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY **BROTHERS BANK, FSB'S MOTION** (FIRST AMERICAN); JOHN DOES "1-TO DISMISS AMENDED 17 1000", **COMPLAINT** 18 Defendants. 19 20 Defendants Wells Fargo Bank NA a/k/a Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (Wells 21 Fargo), whose true name is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells"), and Lehman Brothers 22 Bank, FSB ("Lehman") (collectively the "Defendants"), by and through counsel 23 undersigned, hereby reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 24 Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint. 25 Plaintiff Andrew C. Bailey's ("Bailey") Memorandum in Opposition to the 26 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (the "Response") is based on

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1	nothing more th	nan mere conjecture. In addition to the reasons set forth in the
2	Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Bank. P. 7012	
3	the Defendants should be dismissed for the following reasons:	
4	1)	The Response is based on nothing more than mere conjecture which
5		should not be considered by the Court.
6	2)	The Amended Complaint for Enforcement of Qualified Written
7		Request and Temporary Restraining Order (the "Complaint") does
8		not challenge the validity, priority or extent of the lien at issue.
9	3)	Lehman has a documented interest in the property at issue (the
10		"Property") that may be enforced by Wells.
11	4)	Bailey offers no legitimate argument in opposition to that set forth
12		by the Defendants in the Motion.
13	This Reply is supported by the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities.	
14	<u>N</u>	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
15	I. <u>Legal Arg</u>	<u>gument</u>
16	1. The R	
		desponse is based on nothing more than mere conjecture which
17		desponse is based on nothing more than mere conjecture which not be considered by the Court.
	should	
	should Other than	not be considered by the Court.
18 19	Should Other than unsworn and unpresupport his claims	not be considered by the Court.  a citation to procedural rules, the Response consists of little more than roven assertions. Bailey's conjecture in the Response does nothing to s. <i>Kerr v. Wanderer &amp; Wanderer</i> , 211 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D.Nev. 2002)
18 19 20	Should  Other than unsworn and unpresupport his claims (citation omitted)	not be considered by the Court.  a citation to procedural rules, the Response consists of little more than roven assertions. Bailey's conjecture in the Response does nothing to s. Kerr v. Wanderer & Wanderer, 211 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D.Nev. 2002) c; see also Single Chip Systems Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495
18 19 20 21	Should  Other than unsworn and unpresupport his claims (citation omitted) F.Supp.2d 1052,	a not be considered by the Court.  It citation to procedural rules, the Response consists of little more than roven assertions. Bailey's conjecture in the Response does nothing to so. <i>Kerr v. Wanderer &amp; Wanderer</i> , 211 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D.Nev. 2002) at; see also Single Chip Systems Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495 1062 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 820
18 19 20 21 22	should  Other than unsworn and unpresupport his claims (citation omitted) F.Supp.2d 1052, (9th Cir. 1982).	anot be considered by the Court.  It citation to procedural rules, the Response consists of little more than roven assertions. Bailey's conjecture in the Response does nothing to s. Kerr v. Wanderer & Wanderer, 211 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D.Nev. 2002) s; see also Single Chip Systems Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 820 And the Court should not consider such conjecture because, for the
18 19 20 21 22 23	should  Other than unsworn and unpresupport his claims (citation omitted) F.Supp.2d 1052, (9th Cir. 1982). A purposes of the per	not be considered by the Court.  I citation to procedural rules, the Response consists of little more than roven assertions. Bailey's conjecture in the Response does nothing to s. <i>Kerr v. Wanderer &amp; Wanderer</i> , 211 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D.Nev. 2002) c; see also Single Chip Systems Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495 1062 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 820 And the Court should not consider such conjecture because, for the ending Motion, it is limited to considering only the "facts alleged in
18 19 20 21 22 23 24	should  Other than unsworn and unpresupport his claims (citation omitted) F.Supp.2d 1052, (9th Cir. 1982). A purposes of the perturbation of the complaint, do	not be considered by the Court.  In citation to procedural rules, the Response consists of little more than roven assertions. Bailey's conjecture in the Response does nothing to so. <i>Kerr v. Wanderer &amp; Wanderer</i> , 211 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D.Nev. 2002) at; see also Single Chip Systems Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 820 And the Court should not consider such conjecture because, for the ending Motion, it is limited to considering only the "facts alleged in cuments attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not
18 19 20 21 22 23	should  Other than unsworn and unpresupport his claims (citation omitted) F.Supp.2d 1052, (9th Cir. 1982). A purposes of the perthe complaint, do attached to the complaint.	not be considered by the Court.  I citation to procedural rules, the Response consists of little more than roven assertions. Bailey's conjecture in the Response does nothing to s. Kerr v. Wanderer & Wanderer, 211 F.R.D. 625, 629 (D.Nev. 2002) c; see also Single Chip Systems Corp. v. Intermec IP Corp., 495  1062 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Estrella v. Brandt, 682 F.2d 814, 820) And the Court should not consider such conjecture because, for the ending Motion, it is limited to considering only the "facts alleged in

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668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). Considering those alleged facts, documents, and matters of judicial notice alone, Bailey's claims must and do fail.

## 2. The Complaint does not challenge the validity, priority or extent of the lien at issue.

The Response makes several allegations that the Defendants failed to address Bailey's mere recital of Fed. R. Bank. P. 7001(2) as support for the Complaint. To the contrary, it is Bailey's mere recital of the procedural rule that, more than anything else, bolsters the Defendants' argument that they must be dismissed from the Complaint.

Fed. R. Bank. P. 7001(2) states that an adversary proceeding is a proceeding "to determine the validity, priority or extent of a lien or other interest in property...." Bailey, in the Response, admits that the lien at issue here is valid and that he owes money. (Dkt. #20, 15:12-13). Further, Bailey admits in the Complaint and the Response that the Complaint is nothing more than an action "for enforcement of the QWR and for discovery." (Dkt. #20, 2:13-14; Dkt. #1:20-23.)

Moreover, the Complaint is completely devoid of any allegation challenging the validity, priority or extent of the lien at issue. Rather, Bailey's only allegations in the Complaint regarding the Property itself address the Defendant's authority to foreclose on the Property. (Dkt. #1.) Such allegations are insufficient to support an adversary proceeding under Fed. R. Bank. P. 7001(2) and the Defendant's authority to foreclose on the Property was already sufficiently explained. (Dkt. #14, 2-3, 6-7). Bailey presents no argument in the Response sufficient to contest that explanation.

## 3. Lehman has a documented interest in the Property that may be enforced by Wells.

At the time Wells moved to lift the automatic stay in regard to the Property, it inadvertently failed to state that it was the servicer of the Property. However, this is a fact of no consequence. Although Wells' counsel admittedly believed that Wells was the

beneficiary of the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust at issue here prior to the filing of the Motion, when they became aware of their mistaken belief they notified the Court in the Motion.

Regardless, as stated in the Motion, Wells had authority to initiate and maintain the Trustee's Sale on behalf of Lehman. *Id.* Bailey does not challenge and even admits that the evidence presented by the Defendants to support Wells' authority, specifically Exhibit A to the Motion, is a portion of the Master Seller's Warranties and Servicing Agreement executed by Wells and Lehman. (Dkt. #20, 12:10-11, 17:12-13. If Bailey's only complaint is that he has not been provided with the entire Master Seller's Warranties and Servicing Agreement, it is a matter of public record easily obtainable at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1372936/000112528206005786/

Bailey's mere conjecture to the contrary does nothing to challenge the supported facts set forth above.

## 4. Bailey offers no legitimate argument in opposition to that set forth by the Defendants in the Motion.

The Motion set forth three arguments supporting the propriety of the Defendants' dismissal from the Complaint. Bailey, in the Response, has done nothing to challenge that propriety.

First, Bailey asserts that the Defendants admitted they were not creditors by stating they had no duty to respond to Bailey's alleged Qualified Written Request ("QWR"). To the contrary, the fact that the Defendants had not duty to respond to the QWR is based on the fact that the Defendants' attorneys, and not the Defendants, were provided with a QWR. *Kee v. Fith Third Bank*, No. 2:06-CV-00602-CW, 2009 WL 735048, at \*4 (D.Utah March 18, 2009) (citing Griffin v. Citifinancial Mortgage Co., Inc., No. 3:05cv1502, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6709, \* 6-7, 2006 WL 266106 (M.D.Penn.

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Feb. 1, 2006). This fact is admitted by Bailey. (Dkt. #20, 3:9-11.) To assert that this is somehow an admission by the Defendants regarding their ability to foreclose on the Property is an unjustified leap in logic.

Further, upon information and belief, Wells never responded in whole or in part to the QWR regarding the Property. The QWR attached to the Response as Exhibit A is not the same QWR that has been presented as being provided to Wells. (Lead Case No. 2:09-bk-0679-RTBP, Dkt. # 72, Ex. B.) And Bailey has not and cannot assert that the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 *et seq.*, provides for a private cause of action to enforce a QWR. It does not.

Second, Bailey sets forth no argument to contest the fact that "a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding is not the collection of a 'debt' for purposes of the [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act]." *Mansour v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp.*, 618 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1182 (D.Ariz. 2009) (citing *Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank*, 195 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1204 (D.Or. 2002); *Gray v. Four Oak Court Ass'n*, 580 F.Supp.2d 883 (D.Minn. 2008)). Nor does Bailey contest the fact that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, *et seq.*, does not provide a private cause of action to enforce a Debt Validation Letter.

Third, as set forth above, Bailey makes no legitimate challenge to Wells' authority to initiate and maintain a foreclosure action.

## II. <u>Conclusion</u>

For the foregoing reasons, Wells and Lehman respectfully request that the Court dismiss them from the Complaint with prejudice.

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1	RESPECTFULLY SUMITTED this 26th day of February, 2010.		
2	TIFFANY & BOSCO, P.A.		
3			
4	By: /s/ Leonard J. McDonald, Jr.		
5	Leonard J. McDonald Kevin P. Nelson		
6	2525 E. Camelback Road, 3 <sup>rd</sup> Floor		
7	Phoenix, Arizona 85016-4237  Attorneys for Defendant Wells Fargo		
8	Bank and Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB		
9			
10	ORIGINAL filed electronically with the United		
11	States Bankruptcy Court, District of Arizona,		
12	this $26^{th}$ day of February, 2010, and a copy mailed the $26^{th}$ day of February, 2010 to:		
13	ANDREW C. BAILEY		
14	2500 N PAGE SPRINGS RD		
15	CORNVILLE, AZ 86325		
16	/s/ Paula D. Hillock		
17	7000-003/425807		
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